Stopping the conflation between targeted homelessness prevention and financial assistance

Homelessness is a pressing issue that affects millions of people worldwide. Despite the efforts of governments and non-profit organizations, traditional methods of addressing homelessness often fall short. As we look for innovative solutions, it is crucial to explore new approaches to existing interventions, in this case financial assistance, that can effectively bottleneck the inflow to homelessness.

The challenge

Traditional emergency financial assistance programs often require formal documentation (lease in the client’s name, paystubs, consistent income, proof of ability to stabilize). Those requirements create a high bar for eligibility, which results in programs overwhelmingly serving households who are already

well-positioned to remain housed. These programs typically report very high “success rates” but research shows that this is partly because many applicants may be struggling but would not have necessarily become homeless even without help.

Eviction notice on an apartment door

Understanding the Scope of Homelessness

Targeted homelessness prevention intentionally focuses on the households most likely to fall into literal homelessness without support. The highest-weighted indicators include:

• Not being on the lease or having informal rental arrangements

• Lack of paystubs or formal income verification

• Prior homelessness (past two years specifically)

• Justice involvement

• Disability

• Rent burden/low income in historically disinvested neighborhoods

Rather than filtering for those who can prove long-term stability, this model prioritizes people with the least safety nets and the highest probability of landing in shelter or on the street if we do not intervene.

Why targeted programs, if done effectively, intentionally report lower “success rates”

When programs work with the highest-risk households, some will still fall into homelessness even with support. On paper, this produces a lower “success rate” than programs that only fund “safe bets.” But this delta in the success rate is an indication that we are reaching those who are most vulnerable, rather than those who simply have the cleanest and most easily accessible paperwork, which we refer to as ‘process privilege’. Research reinforces this dynamic:

Evans, Sullivan & Wallskog (Chicago RCT)

Households receiving emergency assistance were 76% less likely to enter shelter, yet only ~2% of denied applicants became homeless — showing most programs were helping many who would have stayed housed anyway.

LA County HPU (predictive targeting)

Highly targeted prevention reduced shelter entry and street outreach contacts by

71% among extremely high-risk households.

Santa Clara County HPS (6-year RCT)

Families receiving targeted prevention were 81% less likely to become homeless

within 6 months and 73% less likely within 12 months.

These studies reach the same conclusion:

Targeting the people most likely to become homeless prevents more homelessness — even if success rates look lower due to the risk profile being higher.

The return on investment

One-time financial assistance in targeted programs typically ranges from $5,000–$10,000 per household and in the CASPEH study, 82% of the unhoused believe that they would one time assistance would have kept them in housing. Compare that with the public-sector cost of homelessness, especially for high-

need individuals, is $60,000–$100,000 per person per year in crisis response, emergency health care, behavioral health, and justice-system costs.

Even if some participants ultimately return to homelessness, preventing or delaying homelessness for the highest-risk households is still the most cost-effective and most humane use of limited dollars. For those with a higher level of vulnerability (E.g.: rent burden above 50%) we aim to help tenants obtain

stability through downsizing of units, housemate matching, employment support, or triage to Tenancy Sustaining Services (TSS) through Cal AIM. In many of our communities, we have Shallow Subsidy Programming (SSP) that offers short term assistance up to $800/mo designed to bring rent burden down to 50% while we work on housing stability planning. A challenge occurs in communities that repurpose their SSP program to be geared towards literal homelessness instead of those rent burdened and at risk of homelessness. An SSP program is not designed to serve literally homeless individuals, who usually need a deep subsidy (PSH match, etc.), so SSP programs are usually used to extend Rapid Rehousing (RRH) titration plans, which essentially ‘kicks the can down the road’ and wastes resources.

Why this approach aligns with equity

Documentation-based programs disproportionately exclude:

• People renting informally or subleasing

• Undocumented residents and informal workers

• Survivors fleeing violence

• Multigenerational or doubled-up households

• Households in historically under-resourced communities

These groups are among those most likely to enter homelessness if assistance is not available. Targeted prevention acts as a corrective by directing resources where the risk and the harm are greatest.

What this means for funders and policymakers:

• A lower success rate does not mean lower performance — it means the program is prioritizing the right people.

• Targeting households most likely to enter homelessness produces the largest reduction to inflow into homelessness for every dollar spent.

• This model does not shy away from high-risk situations. It embraces them because that is where prevention is most impactful.

Logan McDonnell